I think it’s pretty clear where I stand on the Iranian nuclear talks. This is a once in a blue moon chance to bring Iran back into the global community and thereby effect the kind of moderating force on its regional and international behavior that 35 years of ostracism has clearly failed to do. That the United States and our coalition partners, and the Iranians, are apparently ready to flush this opportunity down the toilet over a few thousand primitive uranium centrifuges is ridiculous, because it won’t come easily again. The next U.S. president will, and there’s really no doubt about this, take a significantly harder line on Iran than Obama has, and the next president of Iran, if he comes into office in 2017 at Rouhani’s expense, will likely have been elected in part for his anti-Americanism. The next Supreme Leader of Iran, which is something that really needs to be talked about more since Khamenei is 75 years old, is probably going to want to demonstrate his opposition to America as well. Right now may not be the perfect time for a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, but it’s probably as close to it as we’re likely to get for a long time to come.
That said, if the progress toward a comprehensive deal that’s been made since the original July deadline was extended to November has been as minimal as it appears from the outside, it makes no sense to talk about extending the deadline again. But that’s apparently what Iran’s chief negotiator, Abbas Araghchi, is hinting at here:
In a transcript provided by Fars News Agency, Aragchi said, “Everything is possible, even extending the negotiations.” He did not elaborate on what an extension might look like.
Iran and the P5+1 initially reached an interim deal in November 2013. Iran suspended some nuclear activity in exchange for the temporary lifting of some sanctions and the unblocking of some funds. In July 2014, the negotiators agreed to extend the deadline until Nov. 24.
On the last negotiations that took place on the sidelines of the 69th UN General Assembly, Araghchi said, “In New York, there were expectations that progress would take place, but that did not happen.” Western negotiators also said that “limited progress” had been made in those talks.
An extension of the current state of affairs would be great from the U.S./P5+1 perspective, because Iran’s entire nuclear program is basically in Limbo right now and it hasn’t cost much in the way of sanctions relief. But you have to assume that Iran is going to start asking for more concessions if it’s going to agree to keep framework of the Joint Plan of Action in place. What kind of concessions? What will the P5+1 be prepared to accept? How long an extension are we talking? All this stuff becomes a protracted negotiation in and of itself, one that takes time and attention away from the real talks, and all for the promise of extending a round of negotiations that is literally going nowhere. It might be better, if you’re inclined to root for the sides to ultimately reach a deal, for everybody to go back to their own corners for a few months and come to the table again down the road, hopefully with some fresh ideas for compromise.
There was one other interesting note in that Al-Monitor piece:
According to the spokesman of the parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Seyed Hossein Naghvi-Hosseini, Zarif’s report to the committee about the New York negotiations did not appear optimistic. According to Naghi-Hosseini, Zarif told the committee that lobbies in the United States affiliated with Israel did not want any type of deal made with Iran and for this reason, the United States was not looking to reach an agreement, and that Iran needed to prove to others that they tried to reach a deal. The comments of this committee, which has taken a hard line against the nuclear talks and previously leaked a number of details about the nuclear talks, did not receive wide media coverage inside Iran.
President Hassan Rouhani’s own adviser, Ali Younessi, contradicted Naghvi-Hosseini and said that the United States, of all the P5+1 countries, was the most inclined toward reaching a final deal with Iran, but that China and Russia did not want to see a deal happen. However, he added that he was not optimistic about reaching a final deal.
I don’t know that you can really believe this, and I certainly don’t think the Iranian public would believe it for a second, but there are compelling reasons why Russia and China would want to actually block a deal apart from their concerns over a hypothetical Iranian nuclear weapon (which I think you can assume are legitimate). For one thing, keeping Iran under the sanctions regime drastically limits its commercial options, meaning that Russian and Chinese negotiators can really extract some excellent terms in their trade negotiations with Iran. For another thing, Russia and a sanctions-free Iran would be direct competitors in the energy market, plus keeping Iranian oil mostly off the market raises oil prices and thereby benefits Russia’s energy sector. So it’s not out of the question that those two countries could drag their feet on a deal.
The Foreign Exchanges Companion 