SYRIA
So first the big news. According to Reuters, and I would take this with a grain of salt because they don’t seem to have any confirmation of it, the YPG and the Syrian government have reached an agreement that will see the Syrian army move into Afrin in the coming days to fight the Turks and their rebel proxies. This is described as purely a military arrangement, with Afrin’s political situation left up in the air for the time being. If true this would be a huge development and a very significant escalation of the war, which now would really threaten to stop being a civil war or even an international war-by-proxy and become a full-blown Syria-Turkey war. This is a realignment that would force the US and Russia to make some hard choices about who to back and how deeply to get involved. Does the US keep supporting the YPG even if the YPG is fighting alongside Assad? Does Russia run air cover for the Syrian army even though it has been working to improve relations with Turkey?
This whole story could still turn out to be fiction. And even if it is true, the Kurdish official who passed the information to Reuters said that there is still enough opposition to the deal (presumably in Damascus though perhaps within the YPG as well and quite possibly on the parts of Russia and the US) to quash it.
The development in Afrin may force the Syrian military to divert attention away from what appears to be an “imminent” large-scale attack on the rebel-held Eastern Ghouta enclave. Around 350,000 people are thought to be living under siege in that Damascus suburb, and an assault could alleviate their hunger but would put them in danger of a quicker and more violent death instead. Russia’s involvement in this operation, if there is going to be one, is also unclear.
It all sounds chaotic and horrible, because it mostly is. At LobeLog, Paul Pillar argues that the only way for the United States to “win” in Syria under the current circumstances is not to play the game:
To do its part in avoiding a boiling over, the United States should stop its Donbass-like effort to keep a piece of Syria under the control of itself or its proxies. There is no justification for continuing this effort in terms either of what is most needed to minimize IS terrorism against Western targets or what would induce the other players in Syria to de-escalate or disengage. The United States should do what the Trump administration has not been doing so far, which is to participate in serious, inclusive, multilateral diplomacy aimed at containing and damping down the Syrian conflict. It has left most of the diplomatic action to Russia, Turkey, and Iran.
YEMEN
Yemeni government forces, such as they are these days, attacked a major al-Qaeda outpost in the southeastern part of the country over the weekend, leaving at least 19 AQAP operatives dead against eight Yemeni soldiers. The assaults happened in Yemen’s Hadhramaut province, near the city of Mukalla, which was held by AQAP from April 2015 through April 2016. The Yemenis took control of the nearby Misini Valley, which had been an AQAP stronghold.
The United Nations Security Council is considering a resolution that would condemn Iran for failing to prevent its weapons from getting into Yemen to the Houthis. UN experts say they’ve seen evidence of missile parts, drones, and other military equipment of Iranian origin having gotten into Houthi hands, though they have not been able to say whether any of it was brought in by the Iranians. Still, what they have reported seems to be enough to consider Iran in violation of the UN arms embargo covering Yemen. The resolution, if it passes, would open the door to sanctioning Iranians over further Houthi use of ballistic missiles. It seems likely that Russia would veto this measure but they haven’t yet said anything about it.
ISRAEL-PALESTINE
An improvised explosive device left along the Israel-Gaza border on Friday night exploded on Saturday, injuring four Israeli soldiers. Naturally that wasn’t where things ended:
Israel responded, first, quickly, with tank fire on a Palestinian observation post near the scene of the explosion, and then — after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the episode “severe” and promised to “respond appropriately” — with airstrikes on six targets. That led to an exchange of rockets from Gaza, more tank fire from Israel and a second wave of air attacks early Sunday.
All told, it was some of the bloodiest fighting between Israel and Gaza since the seven-week war in the summer of 2014 that Israel called Operation Protective Edge.
The Israeli strikes killed at least two Palestinians, both teenagers. Nobody has claimed responsibility for the bomb but suspicion is falling on the Popular Resistance Committees, a Fatah splinter group that praised the action on its website. The Israelis are blaming Hamas for organizing astroturf riots near the border fence that provided cover for the attackers to plant the bomb. Which could be true, but let’s not pretend that the people of Gaza don’t have plenty of cause for spontaneous rioting.
Meanwhile, speaking at the Munich Security Conference on Sunday Benjamin Netanyahu said he’s ready to go to war with Iran for some reason:
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday issued a stark warning to Iran, saying his nation was prepared to go to war if the Iranians continue to test Israeli red lines in Syria.
Brandishing what he said was a fragment of an Iranian drone shot down over Israeli territory Feb. 10, Netanyahu cited Iran’s efforts to “colonize” Syria with a permanent military base and use the war-ravaged nation as a launchpad for operations in Israel.
“Israel will not allow Iran’s regime to put the noose of terror around our neck,” he said. “We will act without hesitation to defend ourselves. And we will act, if necessary, not only against Iranian proxies that are attacking us but against Iran itself.”
Israel is not going to war with Iran. Not on its own, anyway. You know why I believe that? Because, despite years of bluster, it still hasn’t gone back to war with Hezbollah, and the reason it hasn’t done that is because the last time Israel went to war against Hezbollah, in 2006, Hezbollah won. Yes, technically that war ended in a “stalemate,” but when one side is the clear attacker and the other is clearly defending, “stalemate” means “the defenders won but the attackers had better PR.” The Israelis seem to know this or else we’d probably have had another Lebanon war since then. Instead, what we’ve gotten has been a couple of Israeli shows of force in Gaza, which can’t really fight back. And if Israel isn’t willing to go to war against Hezbollah anymore, it’s certainly not willing to go to war against Iran and Hezbollah, which is how that would shake out.
Now, Netanyahu might, might, mean to start a war with Iran knowing full well that the United States would have to finish for him, so it’s not like there’s zero chance of a war here. But Netanyahu would have to be damn sure of getting American help before he took that leap. With Donald Trump in office, may be he is. But I think it’s far more likely that Netanyahu’s big angry speech was a little shiny object that he just dangled in front of the Israeli press and public to distract them from the corruption indictments that could be coming down the pike presently.
SAUDI ARABIA
Netanyahu wasn’t the only person who went to Munich to complain about Iran. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, whose country is definitely not almost wholly aligned with Israel on regional policy at this point, echoed Netanyahu’s complaints about Iran destabilizing the region and trying to act as a hegemon. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif responded harshly:
Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir joined Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in blaming Iran for rising regional tensions, at the Munich Security Conference on Sunday.
Jubeir called for “fundamental change in the Iranian regime” after Netanyahu labelled Iran as “the greatest threat to the world” and accused it of trying to impose an “empire” across the Middle East.
Mohammed Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, said in his speech that criticism of his country’s policies in the Middle East had become “obsessive” and denied attempts to become a “hegemon.”
“The US and its local clients in our region are suffering from the consequences of their own wrong choices,” said Zarif. “But they use this and other fora to revive the hysteria on Iran’s foreign policy and try to obscure its realities.”
IRAN
Reuters got its hands on a State Department cable that indicates it might be easier than previously thought to find common ground with France, Germany, and the UK on the Iran nuclear deal such that Donald Trump won’t pull the US out of it. In January, Trump said that unless the deal were changed he would withdraw from it the next time he’s required to waive US sanctions. But the cable, which lays out talking points regarding the deal for US diplomats in Europe, says that the Trump administration wants a “commitment that we should work together to seek a supplemental or follow-on agreement that addresses Iran’s development or testing long-range missiles, ensures strong IAEA inspections, and fixes the flaws of the ‘sunset clause.'” In the absence of that commitment–but notably not in the absence of a deal–the cable says the US will not waive sanctions the next time around.
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